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CLARIFICATION OF FAC~~ 
In its Brief, Respondent Tanglewood SLC Associates, Ltd. 
fails to note that on October 1, 1980, Swapp filed answers to 
the Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories (Record, page 75), 
which is probative of the fact that Swapp responded to discovery 
in the period prior to his abandonment by his former attorney, 
who unofficially withdrew from this case. 
Further, Swapp has testified~ by uncontroverted Affidavit, 
that he was never contacted by his former attorney with regard 
to the Respondent's discovery requests filed after April 2, 1981, 
and that Swapp had no knowledge of the existence or significance 
of the following documents: 
(1) The Interrogatories of Plaintiff Ritchie (Record, page 
. 192) ; 
(2) The Request for Documents of Plaintiff Ritchie (Record, 
page 195); 
(3) The Interrogatories of Defendant Tanglewood (Record, 
page 207); 
(4) The Request for Documents of Defendant Tanglewood 
(Record, page 204); 
( 5) The Notice of Deposition by Defendant Tanglewood 
(Record, page 2 30) i 
(6) The Amended Notice of Deposition by Defendant Tanglewood 
(Record, page 23 4 ); 
(7) The Stipulation regarding future discovery by De-
fendant Tanglewood (Record, page 247); 
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(8) The Motion to Compel Discovery by Defendant 
Tanglewood (Record, page 256); 
(9) The Order granting the Motion to Compel (Record, 
page 267); 
(10) The Default Certificate against Swapp filed by 
Tanglewood (Record, page 271); 
(11) The Motion to Strike Swapp's pleadings by Tanglewood 
(Record, page 276); 
(12) The Order striking Swapp's pleadings (Record, 
page 272); 
(13) The Default Judgment against Swapp by Tanglewood 
(Record, page 279); 
(14) The Order in Supplemental Proceedings of July 10, 
1981 (Record, page 283); 
(15) The Settlement Stipulation between the other parties 
(Record, -page 285); 
(16) The Order in Supplemental Proceedings of August 
13, 1982 (Record, page 288). 
Furthermore, it is clear from the record that the Order 
in Supplemental Proceedings dated July 9th/10th, 1981 (Record, 
pages 283 and 288) was never served on Swapp, and that 
therefore it is without legal significance and effect. 
Moreover, the Order in Supplemental Proceedings signed October 
14, 1981 and filed with the Court on September 3, 1981 (Record, 
page 290) was served at the residence of Swapp upon his son 
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(Record, page 292) at a time when Swapp was still under the 
impression that he was being represented by his attorney. 
By way of further clarification, Swapp draws the 
attention of the Court to the fact that the Respondent, in 
its answering brief, suggests that Swapp was dilatory in 
bringing his Motion to Set Aside the Default Certificate and 
Default Judgment. The record, however, shows the contrary. 
The first service of a post-judgment writ or order made 
upon Swapp personally was an Order to Show Cause and some 
execution papers, served upon him on September 22, 1981 (Record, 
pages 294, 296, and 321). Within ten days after this service, 
Swapp apprised himself of the fact that he had been abandoned 
by his former attorney and sought the assistance of new 
counsel. New counsel appeared with Swapp at the Order to 
Show Cause hearing (Record, page 294) held on October 2, 1981. 
Only nine days elapsed between September 22, 1981 (when Swapp 
was first personally served with an Order to Show Cause and 
some execution papers) and October l, 1981 · (when Swapp rstained 
new counsel). Within that nine day period, Swapp acted 
with dispatch in obtaining counsel and in bringing his Motion 
to set Aside the Default Certificate and the Default Judgment. 
Furthermore, Respondent rnischaracterizes Swapp's brief. 
Swapp never said in his brief (page 5) that he "first became 
-4-
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aware of the judgment on October 1, 1981, when an execution 
was served" (see Tanglewood's answering brief, page 4). 
What Swapp state<l was, "Swapp first became aware of his 
dilemma on or about October 1, 1981, only after receiving 
execution papers on his wife's real property" (see Swapp's 
brief, page 5). Swapp had never been told of his 
,_ 
status as a judgment debtor and had assumed he was being 
represented in the lawsuit by his former attorney, Steven 
D. Luster. Swapp, therefore, assumed that copies of the 
papers served upon him (which papers he did not understand) 
were also being served upon his lawyer whom Swapp thought was 
representing him and taking care of these matters. Swapp 
never understood his "dilemma" (i.e., that he was not being 
represented, that he had been abandoned, and that he was re-
sponsible personally for answering the orders being served 
upon him) until on or about October 1, 1981. 
The Record on Appeal and the Affidavit of Swapp, filed in 
support of his Motion to Set Aside the Default and Default 
Judgment (Record, pages 302, 304 and 306) support this 
interpretation of the facts. 
REBUTTAL ARGUMENTS 
In spite of Respondent's assertions to the contrary, 
the abuse of discretion of the trial court in this case is 
clearly shown by the transcript of the hearing on Swapp's 
Motion to Set Aside the Default and Default Judgment and the 
hearing on the Motion to Vacate and Quash the Execution (Record, 
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page 333). The transcript of that hearing shows that, though 
the Court clearly stated its reasons for denying the plaintiff's 
Motion to Vacate and Quash the Execution, the Court did not 
clearly state its grounds for denying Swapp's Motion to Set 
Aside the Default and Default Judgment, which Motion had been 
made pursuant to ~ule 60(b) (7), inter alia, of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
The whole question in this case is whether or not the 
kind of abandonment or unofficial withdrawal by an attorney that 
occurred in this case comes under Rule 60(b) (1) as 11 negligence 11 
imputable to the client and the remedy for which is a Motion 
To Set Aside to be made within three months from the entry of 
judgment, or whether it is "negligence" which constitutes "any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment 1 
under Rule 60(b)(7) which would not be imputable to the client 
and the remedy for which is a Motion To Set Aside to be made 
within a reasonable time of the entry of judgment (as opposed 
to within three months). The transcript of the hearing (Record, 
page 333) indicates that the trial court did not make this 
distinction in-stating its reasons for denying Swapp's motion 
to set aside, nor did it address itself to the "reasonable time" 
language of Rule 60(b)(7). 
Respondent argues that Swapp's former attorney committed 
Rule 60(b) (1) "negligence," and suggests that any other finding 
would result in an evisceration of the three-month time limit 
-6-
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governing motions to set aside under Rule 60(b) (1). For, argues 
Respondent, if every mistake can be characterized as "any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment," then every motion to set aside a judgment will 
be made under Rule 60(b) (7), and the three-month time limit will 
have no force or meaning. However, the converse argument can 
also be made: If every "negligence" or impropriety of an 
attorney is characterized as "negligence" within the meaning 
/ 
of Rule 60(b)(l), there can be no wrong perpetrated by a lawyer 
against his client that will ever amount to "any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Thus, 
Rule 60(b)(7) will have little, if any, force or meaning. 
Appellant argues that there must be a middle ground; there 
must be a principal of differentiation between the "negligence" 
or "mistake" treated under Rule 60(b) (1) and the "negligence" 
that might be treated under Rule 60(b)(7) as "any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." 
The point of differentiation turns upon the notice to 
the judgment debtor that he is, in fact, a judgment debtor. 
For the three-month rule to operate fairly, the judgment 
debtor should either have knowledge of or have no good cause 
for failing to know of the judgment entered against him. A 
party can be said to either know of or have no good cause for 
failing to know of a judgment entered against him in a situation 
-7-
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where he either chooses to represent himself or when he 
chooses to retain an attorney who is actively representing 
him. A judgment entered against such a person should not 
be set aside beyond the three-month limitation which applies 
to Rule 60(b) (1) because such a judgment debtor or his attorney 
should have notice of any judgment entered against h~m. Even 
if such a judgment were entered against him because his attorney 
plead the wrong defenses, missed filing deadlines or otherwise 
mishandled the case, the judgment should stand unless set 
aside for good cause on a motion made within three months under 
Rule 60(b)(l). The reason for this is that the "negligence 11 
involved in pleading wrong defenses, missing deadlines, or 
otherwise mishandling the case amounts to "negligence" committed 
during the representation of a client. Such negligence ought 
to be imputable to the client becuase it is a risk which every 
client assumes in hiring an attorney, or in the alternative, 
in representing himself. But the "negligence" that results in 
an attorney's abandonment of a client's cause is another matter. 
This latter type is not "negligence" committed during the 
representation of a client's cal.lse. It is "negligence" resulting 
from the failure of an attorney to represent his client at all. 
It amounts to the abandonment of a client, to the unofficial 
withdrawal of the attorney, to the failure of an attorney to 
-8-
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actively pursue his client's cause of ~ction or defenses. This 
type of "negligence" should not be imputed to the client be-
cause the client, at the time he hires his attorney, does not 
assume the risk of abandonment although he l:'lay assume the risk 
- of poor representation. 
This distinction makes sense in light of the time limits 
of Rule 60(b). A Rule 60(b)(l) motion must be made within 
three months. This is fair because, when actively represented, 
a client will within that period either know about the 
judgment entered against him or will have no good reason for 
not knowing about it. But a client who has been abanonded may 
very well not know the status of his case: he may even 
believe tha.t his .;,ttorney has been zealously representi.r1g him, 
whe!l, on the contrary, he has been abandoned, a judgment may 
already have been entered against him, and the three-month 
time limit of Rule 60(b)(l) may have already run out. 
The only problem with this analysis arises when an attorney 
misses a filing or discovery deadline during the representation 
of his client. In other words, in a situation where an 
attorney, has NOT abandoned his client, but has failei to answer 
pleading and a default is entered as a result, the party 
injured by that attorney's "negligence" could theoretically 
claim "abandonment" under Rule 60(b)(7). Thus, any f~ilure 
by an attorney to meet a pleading deadline or to appear at 
a heaz-ing could be deemed an "abandonment." The effect of 
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this would be to destroy the distinction between the Rule 60(b) (1) 
"negligence" committed during representation and Rule 60(b) (7) 
"negligence" resulting from the true abandomnent by an attorney 
of his client's case. For this reason, any party claiming 
"abandonment" under Rule 60(b) (7) must be required to make 
a showing that the attorney's "negligence 11 is not simply a 
mistake made during representation, but that it constitutes 
an aggrevated pattern of attorney impropriety amounting to 
an unofficial withdrawal from the case and an abandonment of 
the client's cause. 
In this present case, Swapp's former attorney's failure 
to represent Swapp did not amount to the missing of one or two 
pleading deadlines or a hearing, or to mistakes made durins 
the representation of Swapp. It constituted an aggrevated 
pattern of impropriety amounting to the abandonment of a client: 
Swapp's former attorney failed to notify his client of discovery 
requirements, of depositions, of a stipulation for further 
discovery, of a motion to compel, of a motion to strike, of a 
default certificate and finally of the default judgment. The 
record also shows that Swapp's former attorney made no 
attempt to set aside the defa.11lt o-E his client. These acts 
-10-
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and omissions do not constitute "negligence" committed during 
the representation of a client, but to an an unofficial 
withdrawal from this case and an abandonment of Swapp's claims 
and defenses. 
T"he distinction which the appellant asserts here is not 
without foundation in law. A number of courts have treated 
the abandonment of a client or the unofficial withdrawal by 
an attorney as "any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of a judgment" under Rule 60(b) (7). The leading 
case, Buckert vs. Briggs, 15 Cal. App. 3rd 296, 93 Cal. ~ptr. 
61 (1971), was cited in crossclaimant-appellant Swapp's Appeal 
Brief (pages 9 and 12). 
The leading case in the Utah jurisdiction is Interstate 
Excavating v. A~la Developme~t , 611 P.2d. 396 (Ut. 1980), cited 
on page 11 of Swapp's Appeal Brief. 
Furthermore, the cases which the Respondent has cited 
in its answering brief also demonstrate both the legality 
and propriety of distinguishing between "negligence" committed 
during the course of legal representation under Rule 60(b)(l) 
from the "negligence" resulting from abandonment or unofficial 
withdrawal by an attorney, constituting "any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment," under 
Rule 60(b)(7): 
1. For example, in Nederlandsche __ I:!C!ndel - Maa!:sc_h:~ppij N. M. 
v. Jay EJ'":lr.1, Inc., 301 F. 2d. 114 (2d Cir. 1962), the negligence 
did not amount to abandonment or unofficial withdrawal, but was 
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the kind of excusable negligence attorneys sometimes commit 
in their profession and which is imputable to their clients. 
The time limit of Rule 60(b) (1) should and did apply in this 
case. The client need not consent to all an attorney does for 
him to be bound by what that attorney does. Because a client 
pays his attorney to act for him, the client is bound 
by his attorneys acts on his behalf. BUt a client does not hire 
an attorney to abandon him. Therefore, a client cannot be 
responsible for the unofficial withdrawal of his attorney 
(especially if he is unaware of it). 
2. In the case of Golan v. Central Intelligence Agency, 
607 F. 339 (DoC. Cir. 1978), the Court included dicta stating 
that there must be "extraordinary" circumstances to obtain 
relief under Federal Rule 60(b) (6) (which is comparable to 
Utah Rule 60(b)(7)). Those "extraordinary" circumstances 
exist in this case where Swapp was virtu.3. l ly abandoned by his 
attorney and where the "negligence" involved was not the 
"excusable" or even "inexcusable" negligence committe·-.1 by an 
attorney actively forwarding his client's cc=\se. 
3. In the case of Pitts v. McClaughlin, 567 P.2d. 171 
(Ut. 1977), the trial court denied a Motion for relief from a 
summary Judgment, and on appeal the Supreme Court of Utah 
affirmed the judgment o~ the trial court. But the Supreme Court 
stated categorically that "we express no opinion as to the 
rights of plaintiffs and defendants and third parties 
in any other l~tigation, but are convinced that Rule 60(b) (1) 
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is dispositive here, and that the circumstances prevailing 
in the instant case are not subject for relief under 60(b) (7)." 
Thus, this case, because it is one that turns upon certain 
peculiar and specific facts, cannot be used as precedent. 
It is clear, however, from the language of the opinion that 
in order for Rule 60(b)(7) to take affect, something other 
than "mistake" or "inadvertance" must be asserted as grounds. 
Mere "inadvertance" alone will not serve as "any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." It is 
Swapp's contention that, in his case, those "extraordinary" 
and independent grounds exist. 
4. Similarly, in the case of Serzvsko v. Chase Manhatten 
Bank, 461 F. 699 (2d Cir. 1972), the decision of the 
Court not to apply Rules 60(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (which are virtually identical to the provisions 
of Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure), turned 
upon the particular facts of that case. There the party 
seeking relief from the judgment made its Motion to Set Aside 
after the expiration of the one-year time limit set by the 
Federal Rules (which is comparable to the three-month 
time limit in the Utah Rules). However, the Court determined 
that the facts of the case did not rise to the level of "a 
fraud upon the Court" which would invoke the residual clause 
of R.ule 60 (b) ( 6) thus obviating the need to comply '-vi th the 
one-year time limit. This is another case that turns uoon 
.i; 
-13-
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facts different from those in the Swapp case. 
5. In the case of Southern Bond Company v. Teel, 
550 P.2d. 571 (Okl. 1976), the Court affirmed the decision 
of the trial court denying defendant's Motion for relief from 
the Judgment. But in that case, the Court specifically noted 
that the attorney's failure to appear on behalf of his client 
was not due to att9rney "abandonment." The Court stated: 
"There is no allegation in the petition to affect 
Woolsey's attorney had abandoned him. 
Generally attorney's ignorance, or mistake, or 
apprehension not occasioned by adverse party, 
does not constitute grounds for vacating a judgment 
..... An attorney's negligence while representing 
client is imputable to the client as negligence and 
does not constitute Unavoidable casualty and mis-
fortune" justifying vacation of judgment under 
statute." 
Although the Court here denied the Motion to Set Aside, it 
suggested very clearly that its grounds for so doing were that 
the defendant's attorneys "negligence" was committed during 
the representation of his client, as opposed to the "negligence 11 
resulting from client abandonment or unofficial withdrawal. 
6. In Stafford v~-~ickison, 374 P.2d. 665 (Ha. 1962), 
a defendant was defaulted and judgment entered against him 
for failure to appear at a pretrial. The trial court ordered: 
Under the circumstances default judgment will 
be entered to take effect thirty days from this 
day during which period the defendant shall have 
-14-
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the opportunity to move to have it set aside. 
Otherwise, it will become final. Defendant will 
be served with a copy of this Minute Order at the 
aforementioned address. 
Defendant did not move to set aside. Shortly thereafter the 
plaintiff moved for the entry of the default judgment. No 
notice ever reached the defendant of this judgment. Eventually 
after the defendant learned of the judgment against him, 
he moved to set it aside. His Motion was denied, and an appeal 
was taken to the Supreme Court of Hawaii. That Court 
stated that the turning point of the entire case was whether 
or not the defendant ever received a copy of the Minute Order 
requiring him to set aside the judgment within thirty days. 
The Court concluded that the defendant had not been served 
with a Minute Order as directed and that, therefore, the de-
fendant had been denied the opportunity to defend himself. 
Furthermore, the Court stated: 
Though an attorney be warranted in withdrawing, 
he should do so on reasonable notice to the client, 
allowing him time to employ another lawyer. 
the withdrawing attorney did not state in his 
withdrawing papers that he had notified his client 
of his withdrawal and according to the statement 
attribute<l to him in the minutes of December 15, 1958, 
he neither had done nor attempted to do so. 
As a result of this fact, the Supreme Court concluded: 
In the present record, the case is one in which 
the Court allowed counsel for the defendant to 
withdraw on the day of pretrial knowing that the 
-15-
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defendant had left the state and had not 
been notified of the hearing or of the with-
drawal of his counsel, and intending t~e 
defendant be defaulted for the nonattention to 
the case resulting from the withdrawal so per-
mitted. Though the Court contemplated that ser-
vice of the Minute Order would save the defendant's 
right to defend, the Order was not served as now 
appears. There was nothing in the record showing 
service of the Minute Order of December 15, 19~8, 
as directed. Upon the argument in this Court, 
plaintiff's attorney stated that he did not send 
defendant a copy and arg11ed that the Clerk was 
descended.· As whether the Court should presume that 
the Clerk sent it, plaintiff's attorney made no 
such contention. 
Furthermore, the Court stated that in this case the defendant 
had made his Motion to Set Asine the Judgment under Federal 
Rule 60(b)(6) within a reasonable time and that the one-year 
limitation did not apply under the circumstances. If anything 
is to be gleaned from this case it is that attorney withdrawal, 
even with the oerrnission of the Court, but without notice to 
his client, deprives the client of an opportunity to defend 
himself and that a motion to set aside a judgment made within 
a reasonable time, even if beyond the one~year time l~~it in 
the rule, will he granted in the interest of justice. 
7. In Tahoe Village Realty v. Desmet, 590 P.2d. 1158 
(Nev. 1979), a number of factual matters exist that distinguish 
that case from the Swapp case before this Court. In De Smet 
the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's denial of relief 
from the Default Judgment. However, in that case the pleading 
which the withdrawing attorney failed to file was not a dis-
-16-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
covery pleading, but a responsive pleading. Furthermore, in 
making their Motion to Set Aside the Default Ji1dgrnent, the 
defendants did not assert that their failure to respond resulted 
from the mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or excusable neglect 
on the part of counsel. Moreover, they also failed to set 
out a meritorious defense to the plaintiff's claim for fraud, 
which was required under the Rules of Nevada. The Court as a 
result of these factors, which are very different from the 
facts of the case before this Court, held that "the grounds for 
setting aside a default judgment were not met and that the 
District Court did not abuse its disgression by refusing to 
set it aside." Again the opinion of the Appellate Court turns 
upon specific facts which are very different from the facts 
in the present case. 
8. Finally, in Williams v. Five Platters, Inc., 510 F. 2d 
963 (United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 1975), 
the Court affirmed the Order Denying Relief from a Default 
Judgment. But in that case, the appellant argued that his 
failure to file a brief in answer to the Motion for Summary 
Judgmen~ was, as set forth in the Affidavit of his attorney, 
due to the attorney's absence from his office, pressure 
of other work in the attorney's office, omission of the matter 
from the attorney's docket, and inability of the attorney to 
contact his client. The Court determined: 
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The reasons given by counsel are such as to 
evidenced neglect, but not excusable neglect. 
Absence from one's office and pressure of work 
are common phenomena. Lawyers who sit constantly 
in their offices with little to do are unlikely 
to be dealing with Rule 60(b) (1). No reason was 
offered in justification for omitting the matter 
from the attorney's docket. The alleged 'inability• 
to contact Williams rested on one letter which went 
unanswered. If Williams was a traveling entertainer 
who left no forwarding addresses, that fact only 
serves to indicate Williams personal neglect of 
the matter. Counsel's neglect of duty is not per se, 
excusable neglect sufficient to entitle Williams 
to a fourth day in Court·under Rule 60(b) (1). Nor 
is ignorance of due dates. . There is, how-
ever, on this record, no fraud to be condoned. 
Though Williams twice alleges fraud and was pro-
vided two opportunities to prove it, he declined 
to do so. 
This decision, too, rests upon circumstances very different 
from those in the Swapp case. Here there were no allegations 
of attorney abandonment. Moreover, the defendant there had 
apparently had three previous opportunities to make his 
case in Court, and the Court in forming the denial from relief of 
judgment was simply refusing to Williams his "fourth day in 
Court." 
CONCLUSIONS 
Thus, as a view of the cases cited by crossclaimant-responden 
Tanglewood indicate, Courts will not grant relief from a default 
and default judgment unless there is a showing of something 
more than attorney "mistake" and "inadvertance." And it is 
precisely that showing that crossclaimant-appellant Swapp has 
made on the record before this Court. 
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Because the impropriety of s~app's former attorney con-
stituted the "extraordinary" circumstances of "abandonment" and 
"unofficial withdrawal," Swapp was denied an opportunity to 
defend himself in the proceedings before the trial court. How-
ever, as soon as he was a?prised of the fact that he had been 
abandoned, Swapp obtained new counsel and made his Motion to 
Set Aside the Default Judgment against him under Ruly 60(b) (7), 
on grounds that the abandonment he had suffered by his attorney 
constituted, not "mistake, inadvertance, surprise or excusable 
neglect," but "other reasons justifying relief from the operation 
of the judgment" allowing him, therefore, to bring his Motion 
To Set Aside beyond the three-month time limit, within a 
reasonable time. 
For the reasons stated herein and in the crossclairnant-
appellant's Appeal Brief, Reid Swapp seeks from this Court 
relief from the Default and the Default Judgment filed against 
him, as well as relief from the Execution predicated thereon. 
·J ,.,) r-'t day DATED this ? of April, 1982. 
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MAILING CBRTIFICATE 
MAILED a true and correct copy of the foregoing to: 
Patricia M. Leath 
John A. Snow 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
Suite 1600, 50 South Main Street 
Sal~ Lake City, Uta 84144 
Attorneys for Tanglewood SLC 
Associates, Ltd., 
Crossclaimant-Respondent. 
postage prepaid this day of April, 1982. 
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